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Improved Bounds on the Threshold Gap in Ramp
Secret Sharing
Ignacio Cascudo, Jaron Skovsted Gundersen, and Diego Ruano
Abstract—In this paper we consider linear secret sharing
schemes over a finite field Fq , where the secret is a vector in
F`q and each of the n shares is a single element of Fq . We obtain
lower bounds on the so-called threshold gap g of such schemes,
defined as the quantity r−t where r is the smallest number such
that any subset of r shares uniquely determines the secret and t
is the largest number such that any subset of t shares provides no
information about the secret. Our main result establishes a family
of bounds which are tighter than previously known bounds for
` ≥ 2. Furthermore, we also provide bounds, in terms of n and q,
on the partial reconstruction and privacy thresholds, a more fine-
grained notion that considers the amount of information about
the secret that can be contained in a set of shares of a given
size. Finally, we compare our lower bounds with known upper
bounds in the asymptotic setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing, introduced independently by Blakley and
Shamir [2], [28], is among the most useful primitives in
cryptography. A secret sharing scheme allows to distribute the
knowledge of a secret among n participants by sending each of
them a piece of information (a share), in such a way that only
certain prescribed subsets of these participants can reconstruct
the secret from the joint information they have received. Secret
sharing schemes are not only useful as a stand-alone primitive
that can be used for secure distributed storage of information,
but also play an important role as an element in more complex
cryptographic tools, in areas such as threshold cryptography
or secure multiparty computation.
In the study of secret sharing schemes and its applications
it is often interesting to determine the amount of information
about the shared secret that can be derived from pooling
together a certain fixed number of shares. We say that a secret
sharing scheme has t-privacy if any set of t shares provides
no additional information about the secret to what was known
a priori. On the other hand, the secret sharing scheme has r-
reconstruction if the knowledge of any set of r shares uniquely
determines the secret. By abuse of notation, fix t to be the
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largest integer for which there is t-privacy and fix r to be
the smallest integer for which there is r-reconstruction. Then
obviously 0 ≤ t < r ≤ n, and we define the threshold gap as
g = r− t, which is thus a strictly positive integer. It is usually
desirable for applications of secret sharing that the privacy and
reconstruction thresholds are as close as possible and hence,
that the threshold gap is small. Since this allows to optimize
the compromise between security against an adversary who
attempts to learn enough shares to gain information about the
secret (for which we want to set t large), and resilience against
losing a number of shares by corruption or other reasons (for
which we want to set r small).
Secret sharing schemes with threshold gap g = 1 are called
threshold secret sharing schemes. Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme (see Section II for its definition) is the most well-
known example of a threshold secret sharing scheme: for any
integers t and n with 1 ≤ t < n, one can construct a Shamir
secret sharing scheme for n participants with t privacy and
t+1 reconstruction. However, Shamir’s scheme presents some
restrictions regarding the size of the secret and shares in terms
of n: in first place, both the secret and each of the shares are
elements of the same finite field, which means that each of
the shares is as large as the secret; in second place, the finite
field must have at least n + 1 elements (remember n is the
number of participants) and therefore each share must be at
least log(n+ 1) bits long.
Typically, in applications of secret sharing we would like
the secret to be as large as possible while the shares are small,
but it turns out that the two restrictions above are unavoidable
for threshold secret sharing schemes, and more in general in
secret sharing schemes with small threshold gap.
Consider first the relation between the size of the shares and
the size of the secret. It is well-known that in any threshold
secret sharing scheme, each share must be at least the same
size as the secret (this holds more generally for any perfect
secret sharing scheme, i.e., any secret sharing scheme where
every set of shares either has full information about the secret
or no information about it). And, more generally, if every share
is an element of a certain alphabet of size q and the secret is
a-priori uniformly distributed in an alphabet of size M , then
it necessarily holds that
g ≥ logqM. (1)
This is a well known bound that is included as a special case
of more general results in [4], [19], [25], [26], which relate
the size of the secret and shares to various properties of the
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access and adversary structures of the secret sharing scheme1.
However, when the only parameter about these structures we
consider is the threshold gap, the bound in (1) is tight: it can
be attained by a generalization of Shamir’s scheme frequently
known as packed Shamir’s scheme, first proposed by Blakley
and Meadows [3] (also defined in Section II) where each share
is in a finite field Fq , the secret is in F`q for some ` ≥ 1 and
we have g = `. We point out that this secret sharing scheme
requires that q ≥ n+`, which indicates that a large number of
participants n will also introduce a restriction for the threshold
gap and the size of secrets and shares, as we will see next.
First, we note that the size of the shares in a threshold
scheme is restricted by the number of participants, as a series
of results have shown. In first place, it is known that threshold
secret sharing schemes where the secret and each share is
in the same alphabet are equivalent to maximum distance
separable (MDS) codes (MDS codes are those which attain the
so-called Singleton bound, see for instance [23]). The length
of these codes is upper bounded by the size of the alphabet
over which they are defined. Exploiting this connection, one
can already show that if 1 ≤ t < n − 1 (and g = 1, since
we are considering threshold schemes), then n < 2q − 2 (see
[12], Theorem 11.113).
But even in the more general case where we do not assume
that the secret is in the same alphabet as the shares (for
example even if the secret is just one bit), it was first noticed
in the unpublished work [20] (see [7] for the statement and
proof) that in any threshold scheme the average bitlength λ∗
of the shares is Ω(log(n−t)). The result was later generalized
in [7], where it was shown that for any secret sharing scheme
where t ≥ 1 (no individual participant obtains information
about the secret) it necessarily holds that
g ≥ n− t+ 1
2λ∗
.
If all shares belong to some alphabet of cardinality q, the
bound can be rewritten as
g ≥ n− t+ 1
q
. (2)
This bound hence establishes that, for certain values of t and
n, there exist limitations on how small the threshold gap can
be that depend solely on the size of the shares (and not on the
secret). The bound was shown to be tight for t = 1 and t = 2
(the latter only in the case q = 2) in [27].
Later, [6] showed that if r ≤ n− 1, the bound
g ≥ r + 1
q
holds, which together with the bound in [7] implies
g ≥ n+ 2
2q − 1
(3)
1The access structure is defined as the family of sets of participants
which can determine uniquely the secret from the shares they hold while
the adversary structure is the family of sets of participants which can obtain
no information about the secret (beyond what they know a priori) from their
shares.
as long as 1 ≤ t < r ≤ n − 1. This last bound had been
shown earlier by [7] only in the case where the secret sharing
scheme is Fq-linear.
The two kinds of limitations that we have mentioned, repre-
sented by Equations (1) and (3) above are incomparable: the
former depends on the relation between the sizes of the secret
and shares, while the latter sets limitations on the relation
between the size of the shares and the number of participants.
Note that, even though the bound given in Equation (1) can
be attained by the Blakley-Meadows construction, this requires
that n < q, and therefore the bound is not necessarily tight
when n grows in relation to q (and in fact in general it cannot
be attained, by virtue of Equation (3)). It is then natural to
investigate what bounds one can get which depend on all
these parameters simultaneously. In this regard, for Fq-linear
schemes where the secret is in F`q with ` ≥ 2 and each share
is in Fq , [7] showed the bound
g ≥ n+ 2
2q + 1
+
2q
2q + 1
(`− 1) (4)
which is tighter than the straightforward combination g ≥
max{`, n+22q−1} of Equations (1) and (3), when ` is large
enough.
Another bound depending on both the share size and the
relation between the size of the shares and the size of the
secret can be deduced from [13]. In the language of all-or-
nothing transforms they present a bound which in the setting
of secret sharing implies
g ≥ r
q
+ 1− q − 1
q
r
q` − 1
. (5)
Here one should note that as ` increases the bounds tends to
g ≥ rq + 1. So for large enough ` the bound in (4) performs
better than this bound.2
A. Contributions
In this paper we focus on Fq-linear secret sharing schemes
where secrets are in F`q and every share is in Fq . In Section
III, we improve the bound (4) given in [7]. More precisely our
main result (Theorem 3.2) is a family of bounds given by
g ≥ q
m − 1
qm+1 − 1
(n+ 2) +
qm+1 − qm
qm+1 − 1
(`− 2m), (6)
for m = 0, 1, . . . , `−1, and we show that for any ` ≥ 2, there
is some m for which this new bound is tighter than (4).
We obtain these bounds by proving limitations on the so-
called partial privacy and reconstruction thresholds. These are
defined as follows: let ri, for i = 1, . . . , `, be the smallest
number such that every set of shares of that size gives at
least i q-bits of information about the secret and let ti, also
for i = 1, . . . , `, be the largest integer such that every set of
shares of that size learns less than i q-bits about the secret. We
call ti and ri the partial privacy and reconstruction thresholds,
2We also remark the similarities with the bound from Theorem 4.4 stating
that g ≥ r+1
q
+ q−1
q
bi, where bi is an non-negative integer. With bi ≥ 1
this bound is tighter than r
q
+ 1 and even for bi = 0 the bound in (5) can
only be one unit larger and in order to be larger we require a large `.
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respectively, and note that r` = r and t1 = t which means that
g = r` − t1.
Relative generalized Hamming weight (RGHW) was first
studied in the context of wiretap channel of type II, see [22].
However, when representing a linear secret sharing scheme as
a nested code pair, it is shown in [17], [21] that the RGHWs of
the pair of nested codes used in the construction determine the
partial thresholds. Combining this with the Griesmer bound on
the RGHWs implies limitations for ti and ri which eventually
leads to the bounds in (6).
We emphasize that the improvement over (4) comes from
two sources. The main one is the fact that we use results on the
application of Griesmer bounds directly to the RGHWs instead
of using a shortening argument to bound r and t and then
applying the Griesmer bound to the resulting code as in [7]. In
addition, we set a parameter m that determines how we bound
each of the summands appearing in the Griesmer bound, while
[7] simply set m = 1. This provides more flexibility, which
for example is beneficial when proving asymptotic bounds (see
Theorem 5.1).
In Section IV we prove some additional results on the rela-
tion between the partial privacy and reconstruction thresholds.
We remark that this also imply bounds on the RGHWs and
therefore might also be relevant in the context of wiretap
channel of type II. In this section we follow more or less the
same approach as in [7] but generalize some of their results
on r and t to the partial thresholds. We derive that as long as
t ≥ 1, we necessarily have
ri ≥
n
q`−i+1
+ 1
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , `}. Note that for i = ` we obtain r ≥ nq +1.
This is a bound that was also shown in [7] and was used to
prove the more general inequality (2).
Moreover, we can also prove this bound under milder
conditions, namely if tj ≥ j for some j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, then
the same bound
ri ≥
n
q`−i+1
+ 1
holds, but now for every i ∈ {j, j + 1, . . . , `}.
This leads to the following generalization of (3):
g ≥ n+ 2
2q − 1
+
q − 1
2q − 1
(ai + bi),
where ai = ti− t− i+ 1 ≥ 0 and bi = r− r`−i+1− i+ 1 ≥ 0
are two quantities that capture how much the scheme deviates
from the situation where t1 = t, t2 = t+ 1, . . . , t` = t+ `− 1
and r` = r, r`−1 = r − 1, . . . , r1 = r − ` + 1, which occurs
in the scheme of Blakley-Meadows (also known as packed
Shamir), and which would correspond to ai = 0, bi = 0 for
all i. At last in this section, we consider an example attaining
this bound.
There are several potential uses of partial reconstruction and
privacy thresholds in cryptography. For example, the notion of
functional secret sharing introduced in [1] considers a scenario
where large enough sets of participants can recover certain
functions of the secrets and hence the threshold ri gives
us some information about functional secret sharing schemes
where the output of the functions of interest consist of i q-bits.
On the other hand, considering a relaxed notion of privacy (the
threshold ti) may be interesting in applications where secret
sharing is combined with some other privacy amplification
technique. For example with the goal of constructing a linear-
time encodable secret sharing scheme [11] combines an error
correcting code (which can be seen as a secret sharing scheme
where small sets of participants can obtain partial information
about the secret) with a hash function that destroys this
partial information, so that perfect privacy is obtained in
the final construction. This combination of “imperfect” secret
sharing and privacy amplification may be of interest in secure
computation, too. Our bounds on ti and ri would set some
limitations on those potential applications as well.
Finally, we consider asymptotic secret sharing schemes in
Section V. We adopt the setting considered in [16], define an
asymptotic threshold gap (in Equation (24)) and provide the
asymptotic version of the previous bounds. At the end, we
compare our bound with the asymptotic version of the bounds
in [7] and investigate how sharp is our bound by comparing
it with threshold gaps of secret sharing schemes constructed
from algebraic geometric codes (in the case of large fields)
and from random linear codes (for small fields).
II. SECRET SHARING
In this section, we recall some notions regarding secret
sharing schemes and their relationship with linear codes.
Let S0, S1, . . . , Sn be random variables taking values in
the finite alphabets S0,S1, . . . ,Sn. Then we call S =
(S0, S1, . . . , Sn) a vector of random variables. In this paper,
we let I = {0, 1, . . . , n} and I∗ = {1, 2, . . . , n} for some
n ∈ N and for a subset A ⊆ I we denote by SA the vector
(Si)i∈A. Notice that S = SI . With this notation we define a
secret sharing scheme.
Definition 2.1 (Secret Sharing Scheme): A secret sharing
scheme Σ is a vector of random variables
S = (S0, S1, . . . , Sn) ∈ S0 × S1 × · · · × Sn,
such that
Hq(S0) = logq |S0|,
where Hq is the Shannon entropy with base q.3 Further, we
require that
Hq(S0|SI∗) = 0.
We call S0 the secret and, for i ∈ I∗, we call Si the i’th share.
The scheme has n participants, which we identify with the set
I∗, and the i’th participant holds Si, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The requirement that Hq(S0) = logq |S0| implies that the
random variable S0 is uniformly distributed in S0; while it
is of course possible to consider secret sharing schemes with
a different distribution on the secret space, it was shown in
[5] that such scheme could be transformed into one where the
distribution of secrets is uniform and with the same reconstruc-
tion and privacy thresholds (introduced below). Therefore, this
assumption is without loss of generality for our purposes.
3Note that Hq is the Shannon entropy of base q and not the Rnyi entropy
of order q.
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The other requirement, that Hq(S0|SI∗) = 0, means that
the secret is uniquely determined by the set of all the shares
with probability 1.
A secret sharing scheme is called linear if S is uniformly
distributed on some subspace V ⊆ S0 × S1 × · · · × Sn and
if Si is a Fq-vector space for all i ∈ I where Fq is the
finite field with q element. In this paper, we will focus on
the schemes, where Si is one-dimensional for i ∈ I∗ and S0
is `-dimensional. Without loss of generality we can assume
that S0 = F`q and Si = Fq for the i ∈ I∗.
Linear secret sharing schemes are also characterized by the
following property; consider two secrets s, t ∈ S0 = F`q .
Let x ∈ Fnq be a possible share vector for the secret s, i.e.
P ((S0,SI∗) = (s,x)) > 0, and y ∈ Fnq a possible share
vector for t. Thus, (s,x) ∈ V and (t,y) ∈ V . For a, b ∈ Fq ,
we have (as + bt, ax + by) ∈ V , proving that
P ((S0,SI∗) = (as + bt, ax + by)) > 0.
Therefore, a linear combination of share vectors results in a
share vector for the same linear combination of the corre-
sponding secrets. This property makes linear secret sharing
schemes very useful for secure multiparty computation and
threshold cryptography.
Well known examples of linear secret sharing schemes
are Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and its generalization by
Blakley and Meadows, described below. Assume that n+ ` ≤
q. Let α0,1, α0,2, . . . , α0,`, α1, α2, . . . , αn ∈ Fq be pairwise-
distinct. Fix an integer ` − 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 and define the
vector of random variables S given by selecting a polynomial
uniformly at random among the set of polynomials in Fq[X]
of degree less than k and defining S0 as the variable taking
the value (f(α0,1), f(α0,2), . . . , f(α0,`)) ∈ F`q and each of
the Si’s as the variables taking values f(αi) ∈ Fq . Note that
the condition n + ` ≤ q can be weakened to n ≤ q by using
an element of an extension field as a single evaluation point
for the secret, rather than the elements α0,1, α0,2, . . . , α0,`, as
was done in for example [9].
Shamir’s scheme as defined in [28] is the version with ` = 1
and α0,1 = 0. Blakley and Meadows’ scheme is sometimes
referred to as packed Shamir’s scheme. It is easy to verify
that this scheme is linear.
The following alternative definition of linear secret sharing
schemes was given in [10]. For completion we show that the
definitions are equivalent in Appendix.
Let C1, C2, and L be linear codes in Fnq , such that C1 =
L ⊕ C2. Further, let dimL = `, dimC2 = k2, dimC1 =
k1 = k2 + `, and let {b1,b2, . . . ,b`} be a basis of L and
{b`+1,b`+2, . . . ,bk1} be a basis of C2. We define a linear
secret sharing scheme from the nested linear codes C2 ( C1
in the following manner. Given the secret s ∈ F`q , choose k2
uniformly random elements in Fq , say a1, a2, . . . , ak2 . Then
the vector
c =s1b1 + s2b2 + · · ·+ s`b`
+ a1b`+1 + a2b`+2 + · · ·+ ak2bk1 ∈ C1
is called a share vector and the i’th share is defined to be the
i’th entry of this vector c. One should notice that, setting the
distribution of the secret to be uniform in F`q , this is indeed
a secret sharing scheme according to our definition, since the
set of all shares corresponds to a vector in C1 = C2⊕L which
can be projected into a unique element in L.
In secret sharing, we are interested in determining which
subsets of participants are able to reconstruct the secret from
their shares and which subsets are not. This leads to the
definition of privacy and reconstructing sets.
Definition 2.2 (Privacy and reconstructing set): Let Σ be a
secret sharing scheme given by the vector of random variables
S and let A ⊆ I∗. Then A is a privacy set if
Hq(S0|SA) = Hq(S0),
and A is a reconstructing set if
Hq(S0|SA) = 0.
As in Definition 2.1, Hq(S0|SA) = 0 implies that the secret
is uniquely determined by the shares held by the participants
in A. On the other hand, Hq(S0|SA) = Hq(S0) is equivalent
to S0 and SA being independent. Therefore, the participants
in A have no information about the secret from their shares.
Additionally, we can define the information held by the
participants in A using the mutual information
Iq(S0,SA) = Hq(S0)−Hq(S0|SA). (7)
This quantity is measured in q-bits and lies between 0 ≤
Iq(S0,SA) ≤ Hq(S0). It equals 0 exactly when A is a privacy
set and it equals Hq(S0) exactly when A is a reconstructing
set. One should notice that for linear secret sharing schemes
with S0 = F`q we have Hq(S0) = `. Furthermore, it is shown
in [21] that for such schemes the mutual information is given
by
Iq(S0,SA) = dimπA(C1)− dimπA(C2), (8)
where πA is the projection πA : Fnq → F
|A|
q given by πA(c) =
cA. Hence, we conclude that, in linear secret sharing, the
information about the secret held by some set of participants,
when expressed in q-bits, is always an integer between 0 and
`. Furthermore, we have for a subset A ⊆ I∗ and an element
i ∈ I∗ \A that
Iq(S0,SA) ≤ Iq(S0,SA∪{i}) ≤ Iq(S0,SA) + 1.
The set of all privacy sets is called the adversary structure of
the scheme and is denoted by A(Σ). Similarly, the set of all
reconstructing sets is called the access structure and is denoted
by Γ(Σ). From these definitions we introduce some thresholds
for the secret sharing schemes.
Definition 2.3 (Privacy and reconstruction threshold): Let Σ
be a secret sharing scheme with adversary structure A(Σ) and
access structure Γ(Σ). The privacy threshold t for the scheme
Σ is given by the maximal s such that
{A ⊆ I∗ : |A| = s} ⊆ A(Σ).
Similarly, the reconstruction threshold r is given by the
minimal s such that
{A ⊆ I∗ : |A| = s} ⊆ Γ(Σ).
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Definition 2.4 (Threshold gap): Let Σ be a secret sharing
scheme, and let t and r be the privacy and reconstruction
threshold, respectively. Then
g = r − t
is the threshold gap.
By (7) it can be deduced that 0 ≤ t < r ≤ n, and
therefore the threshold gap g is always a positive integer.
Secret sharing schemes with r = t + 1, and therefore g = 1,
are called threshold secret sharing schemes. As mentioned in
the introduction it is often desirable to have a small g, but this
will have the disadvantage that the shares are large compared
to the secret, which means one has to consider this trade-off.
In a secret sharing scheme with secrets larger than the
shares, some subsets of participants will obtain partial infor-
mation about the secret. This gives rise to defining the partial
privacy and reconstruction thresholds in a similar manner that
we defined t and r.
Definition 2.5 (Partial thresholds): The i’th partial privacy
threshold of a secret sharing scheme, ti, is given by
ti = max{s | ∀A ⊆ I∗, |A| = s, Iq(S0,SA) < i}.
Similarly, the i’th partial reconstruction threshold, ri, is given
by
ri = min{s | ∀A ⊆ I∗, |A| = s, Iq(S0,SA) ≥ i}.
This means that ti is the maximal number such that all sets
of ti participants do not obtain i q-bits of information. On the
other hand, ri is the minimal number such that all subsets of
ri participants can reconstruct i q-bits of information.
Since the information in q-bits is always a nonnegative
integer and the maximum information is ` we have that t = t1
and r = r`.
We will denote the dual of a linear code C by C⊥, the
minimum distance by dmin(C), the support by
supp(C) = {i : ∃(c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ C, ci 6= 0},
and the support weight by wS(C) = |supp(C)|. With these
definitions, the i’th relative generalized Hamming weight
(RGHW) is defined as
Mi(C1, C2) = min{wS(D) : D ⊆ C1,
D ∩ C2 = {0},dim(D) = i}.
We notice that the first RGHW is simply the minimum
Hamming weight of C1 \C2, which implies that dmin(C1) ≤
M1(C1, C2). For C2 = {0} we have dmin(C1) = M1(C1, C2).
In [17], [21] it is shown that the RGHWs characterize the
partial privacy and reconstruction thresholds. They showed that
ti = Mi(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 )− 1
ri = n−M`−i+1(C1, C2) + 1.
(9)
Further, it is shown in [22] that Mi(C1, C2) is strictly increas-
ing with i, which implies that ti < ti+1 and ri < ri+1, for all
i = 1, 2 . . . `− 1.
In particular, (9) yields
t = M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 )− 1
r = n−M1(C1, C2) + 1
g = n−
(
M1(C1, C2) +M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 )
)
+ 2,
(10)
which implies that
t ≥ dmin(C⊥2 )− 1
r ≤ n− dmin(C1) + 1
g ≤ n+ 2−
(
dmin(C1) + dmin(C
⊥
2 )
)
.
(11)
III. BOUNDS FROM THE GENERALIZED GRIESMER BOUND
In applications, we often want secret sharing schemes where
the privacy and reconstruction thresholds are close to each
other, which means that we want the threshold gap to be small.
From this point of view, we could refer to the bounds in (11)
as positive bounds.
However, as it was mentioned in the introduction, there
are known restrictions for how small the shares of such
schemes can be when one requires a small threshold gap.
These restrictions come from two sources: the relative size of
the secret with respect to the shares and the relation between
the size of the shares and the total number of participants.
In this section we obtain new bounds for the threshold
gap of linear secret sharing schemes that depend on the two
aforementioned factors simultaneously and show how they
improve previous bounds in all cases.
First we recall known bounds. As in the previous section,
let F`q be the space of secrets and let each of the shares be
an element of Fq . Then, it is well-known that g ≥ `. This
is a consequence of the more general result, also valid for
non-linear secret sharing schemes, that g ≥ H(S0)/H(Si) for
every share Si, as proved in [4]. Coming back to the linear
case, it is interesting to see this bound in the light of partial
privacy and reconstruction thresholds too: in the context of
Wiretap channel type II, the results in [22] imply the following
bounds on ti and ri:
ti ≤ k2 + i− 1
ri ≥ k2 + i,
(12)
which combined also yield g ≥ `. This bound is of the first
type mentioned above: it only depends on the relation between
the size of the secret and the size of the shares, but does not
take into account the number of participants. The bound is
attainable by the Blakley-Meadows’ secret sharing scheme,
but this scheme requires n ≤ q.
In [7] lower bounds on the threshold gap depending on the
number of participants and its relation to the size of the shares
were derived. If we denote by
BCCX(1)(n, q) =
n+ 2
2q − 1
,
BCCX(2)(n, q, `) =
n+ 2
2q + 1
+
2q
2q + 1
(`− 1),
then the bounds in [7] state that
g ≥ BCCX(1)(n, q), if 1 ≤ t < r ≤ n− 1
g ≥ BCCX(2)(n, q, `), if ` ≥ 2.
(13)
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Both bounds were proved in [7] for linear secret sharing
schemes. However, the first one is also valid for non-linear
secret sharing schemes, as shown in [6].
Note that both bounds exclude the case ` = 1 and t = 0, and
the case ` = 1 and r = n. This is unavoidable, since in both
cases there exist secret sharing schemes where n and q are
unrestricted. Indeed in the first case the scheme consisting on
simply distributing the secret to all participants fulfils r = 1,
and hence g = 1. On the other hand, for the second case
consider additive secret sharing schemes, where the secret is
the sum of all the shares, implying that t = n− 1. Note that
the second bound implies that the bound g ≥ ` we mentioned
above cannot be attained with equality for all n and q as long
` ≥ 2.
In the following, by considering RGHWs, we construct
a new lower bound on the threshold gap for linear secret
sharing schemes which, as in the case of g ≥ BCCX(2)(n, q, `),
also takes both the secret and the share size into account.
Additionally, we will derive limitation bounds on ti and ri
using the same approach. We will compare the bound on the
threshold gap with the bounds in (13), showing improvement
in most cases.
We first present the following bounds on the RGHWs
from [31] also known as the generalized Griesmer bounds on
RGHW.
Proposition 3.1: Let C2 ( C1 be linear codes. For 0 ≤ i ≤
k1 − k2 = `, the i’th RGHW satisfies
n ≥ k2 +Mi(C1, C2) +
`−i∑
j=1
⌈
q − 1
qj(qi − 1)
Mi(C1, C2)
⌉
.
By using that dae ≥ a, for the first m terms in the sum, and
dae ≥ 1, for the remaining terms, we write
n ≥k2 +Mi(C1, C2)
+
q − 1
qi − 1
Mi(C1, C2)
m∑
j=1
1
qj
+ `− i−m
which is equivalent to
n ≥ k1 − i−m+Mi(C1, C2) +
qm − 1
qm+i − qm
Mi(C1, C2).
Isolating the RGHW, we obtain
Mi(C1, C2) ≤
qm+i − qm
qm+i − 1
(n− k1 + i+m) . (14)
Similar arguments show that
Mi(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) ≤
qm+i − qm
qm+i − 1
(k2 + i+m) . (15)
One should notice that different choices of m lead to different
bounds on the RGHWs. It is not necessarily the highest
possible m which gives the best bound, and hence we need to
choose the parameter m carefully in order to make the bound
as good as possible.
The expressions in (14) and (15) lead to the following
bounds on the partial privacy and reconstruction thresholds
together with the threshold gap as well.
Theorem 3.2: Let C2 ( C1 define a linear secret sharing
scheme. Then for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `},
ti ≤
qm+i − qm
qm+i − 1
(k2 +m+ i)− 1,
r`−i+1 ≥
qm − 1
qm+i − 1
n+
qm+i − qm
qm+i − 1
(k1 −m− i) + 1,
for all m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , `− i}. Now, let
BGr
(m)(n, q, `) =
qm − 1
qm+1 − 1
(n+ 2) +
qm+1 − qm
qm+1 − 1
(`− 2m).
Then the threshold gap satisfies
g ≥ BGr(m)(n, q, `),
for all m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , `− 1}.
Proof: For r`−i+1 we combine (9) and (14) and obtain
r`−i+1 ≥ n−
qm+i − qm
qm+i − 1
(n− k1 + i+m) + 1⇔
r`−i+1 ≥
qm − 1
qm+i − 1
n+
qm+i − qm
qm+i − 1
(k1 −m− i) + 1.
Similarly the bound on ti follows by combining (9) with (15).
In order to show the bound on g, we recall from (10) that
g = n+ 2−
(
M1(C1, C2) +M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 )
)
,
which by (14) and (15) yield
g ≥ q
m − 1
qm+1 − 1
(n+ 2) +
qm+1 − qm
qm+1 − 1
(`− 2m)
for all m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , `− 1}.
One should notice that g ≥ BGr(0)(n, q, `) leads to the well-
known bound g ≥ `. Hence, for secret sharing schemes having
` = 1, this bound on the threshold gap do not improve the
existing bounds. However, when ` ≥ 2 we will show that there
exist choices of m such that BGr(m)(n, q, `) is at least as good,
and in almost all cases, better than the bounds BCCX(1)(n, q)
and BCCX(2)(n, q, `) in (13). We only consider m = 0, which
imply g ≥ ` as explained above, and m = 1, which imply the
bound
g ≥ BGr(1)(n, q, `) =
q − 1
q2 − 1
(n+ 2) +
q2 − q
q2 − 1
(`− 2)
=
n+ 2
q + 1
+
q
q + 1
(`− 2).
One should notice that other choices of m could improve
BGr
(m)(n, q, `), but in the following theorem we show that
either m = 0 or m = 1 imply a bound which is at least as
good as the known bounds.
Theorem 3.3: Let ` ≥ 2, then
BGr
(1)(n, q, `) ≥ BCCX(1)(n, q), (16)
and
BGr
(0)(n, q, `) ≥ BCCX(2)(n, q, `), when ` ≥ n− 2(q − 1),
BGr
(1)(n, q, `) ≥ BCCX(2)(n, q, `), when ` ≤ n− 2(q − 1).
(17)
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Proof: In order to prove (16) we consider the difference
BGr
(1)(n, q, `)− BCCX(1)(n, q)
=
n+ 2
q + 1
+
q
q + 1
(`− 2)− n+ 2
2q − 1
=
q − 2
(q + 1)(2q − 1)
(n+ 2) +
q
q + 1
(`− 2)
≥ 0,
(18)
where the inequality holds for all n and q, since ` ≥ 2 and
q ≥ 2.
To prove (17) we start by considering the difference
BGr
(0)(n, q, `)− BCCX(2)(n, q, `)
= `−
(
n+ 2
2q + 1
+
2q
2q + 1
(`− 1)
)
=
`− n+ 2(q − 1)
2q + 1
.
This is greater than or equal to zero if
` ≥ n− 2(q − 1).
Similarly, the difference BGr(1)(n, q, `) − BCCX(2)(n, q, `)
is greater than or equal to zero if
0 ≤ n+ 2
q + 1
+
q
q + 1
(`− 2)−
(
n+ 2
2q + 1
+
2q
2q + 1
(`− 1)
)
⇔
0 ≤ q
(q + 1)(2q + 1)
(n− `+ 2)− 2q
2
(q + 1)(2q + 1)
⇔
` ≤ n− 2(q − 1),
which proves (17).
Remark 3.4: One should notice that the inequality in (18)
is strict if ` > 2 or if ` ≥ 2 and q > 2 showing that the
bound BGr(1)(n, q, `) is sharper in these cases. Similarly, if
` 6= n − 2(q − 1) and ` ≥ 2 there exists a choice of m such
that BGr(m)(n, q, `) > BCCX(2)(n, q, `).
In order to illustrate how much this new bound on the threshold
gap improves the existing bounds we consider an example.
Example 3.5: Let q = 2, n = 100, and ` = 10.
Then the well-known bound g ≥ ` yields g ≥ 10. The
bound BCCX(1)(100, 2) implies g ≥ 34. Similarly, the bound
BCCX(2)(n, q, `) implies g ≥ 28, since we can round up
because the threshold gap is an integer. However, for m = 4,
which is the optimal value for m in this example, we have⌈
BGr
(4)(100, 2, 10)
⌉
= 51. Hence, we conclude that a linear
secret sharing scheme over F2 with 100 participants for
sharing 10-bit long secrets has a threshold gap greater than
or equal to 51.
We return to the bounds in Theorem 3.2 in Section V, where
the bounds are considered asymptotic. Before that, we will
focus on the bound BCCX(1)(n, q).
IV. FURTHER BOUNDS ON THE PARTIAL
RECONSTRUCTION THRESHOLDS
Now, we will consider the bound g ≥ BCCX(1)(n, q) from
[7] more in depth. This bound is obtained first by proving
that r ≥ nq + 1 under the assumption that t ≥ 1, later using
shortening of secret sharing schemes to show g ≥ n−t+1q
(still assuming t ≥ 1) and finally applying this bound to the
scheme and its dual, which yields g ≥ BCCX(1)(n, q) under
the conditions t ≥ 1, r ≤ n− 1.
In this section we consider the first step of that argument
(the one showing r ≥ nq + 1 if t ≥ 1) and explore
its generalization to the partial reconstruction and privacy
thresholds when ` > 1. First, we show that we can obtain
the same bound on r but under a weaker assumption, tj ≥ j.
Note that t ≥ 1 implies tj ≥ j for all j, since tj < tj+1
as mentioned in Section II, but the converse is not necessarily
true. Furthermore, we may extend the results to obtain bounds
for the partial reconstruction thresholds as well. We will derive
that
ri ≥
n
q`−i+1
+ 1,
for i ∈ {j, j + 1, . . . , `}, if tj ≥ j. Notice that under the
assumption t ≥ 1 we obtain that ri ≥ nq`−i+1 + 1, for all
1 ≤ i ≤ `. Similarly, the result r ≥ nq + 1 holds even if we
only assume that t` ≥ `. From these results on ri we will also
generalize the bound g ≥ BCCX(1)(n, q) by using shortening
of codes.
Before proving the new bound for partial reconstruction
thresholds we shall consider Lemma 4.1 and introduce the
following notation. For a subset V ⊆ Fnq , an element a ∈ Fq ,
and an index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} define
(V )a,i = {v ∈ V : πi(v) = a}.
Note that if V is a linear code, where (V )a,i 6= ∅ for some
a 6= 0, then
|(V )a,i| = |(V )b,i| (19)
for all a, b ∈ Fq by the linearity of V .
Lemma 4.1: Let C2 ( C1 define a secret sharing scheme
and assume that tj ≥ j for some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `}. Then
there exists a set W = {v1,v2, . . . ,v`−j+1} ⊆ L, such that
the elements in W are linearly independent, and for all m ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n} and k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ` − j + 1}, we either have
that
πm(C2) = {0} and πm(vk + C2) = {0}
or
|(C2)a,m| = |(vk + C2)a,m| = qk2−1, for all a ∈ Fq.
Proof: Let B = {m : πm(C2) = {0}} and notice that
πB(C1) = πB(L ⊕ C2) = πB(L). For any A ⊆ B we
have that Iq(S0,SA) = dimπA(C1) = dimπA(L) ≤ `. Now
consider the homomorphism πB : L→ F|B|q , and assume that
dimπB(L) ≥ j. Then one can puncture the code πB(L) at a
set A with cardinality j, such that dimπA(L) = j. This con-
tradicts the assumption that tj ≥ j. Hence, dimπB(L) < j,
which means that the kernel of πB has dimension at least
` − j + 1. Let W consists of ` − j + 1 linearly independent
vectors in this kernel.
let m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ` − 1} \ B and a vk ∈ W . By (19),
|(C2)a−πm(vk),m| = qk2−1, for all a ∈ Fq . This shows that
|(vk + C2)a,m| ≥ qk2−1, for all a ∈ Fq . However, since C2
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and vk +C2 can be considered as quotient classes in C1/C2,
we have that |C2| = |vk + C2| = qk2 , implying that
|(vk + C2)a,m| = qk2−1
for all a ∈ Fq .
We can now prove the aforementioned generalizations on ri.
Theorem 4.2: Let C2 ( C1 define a secret sharing scheme.
If tj ≥ j the thresholds ri satisfy
ri ≥
n
q`−i+1
+ 1,
for i ∈ {j, j + 1, . . . , `}.
Proof: By assumption i ≥ j, implying that ` − i +
1 ≤ ` − j + 1. Therefore, by Lemma 4.1 there exists
v1,v2, . . . ,v`−i+1 ∈ L linearly independent vectors satisfy-
ing for all m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and k ∈ {1, 2 . . . , ` − i + 1},
that πm(C2) = {0} and πm(vk + C2) = {0} or
|(C2)a,m| = |(vk + C2)a,m| = qk2−1,
for all a ∈ Fq . We define the vector space
V (r1, r2, . . . , r`−i+1)
to be the span of the following set
{v1 + r1,v2 + r2, . . . ,v`−i+1 + r`−i+1}
for some vectors rk, and consider the sum∑
r1∈C2
∑
r2∈C2
· · ·
∑
r`−i+1∈C2
wS(V (r1, r2, . . . , r`−i+1)).
From the fact that v1,v2, . . . ,v`−i+1 are linearly independent,
rk ∈ C2, and vk ∈ L for all k, the set V (r1, r2, . . . , r`−i+1)
is an ` − i + 1 dimensional vector space in C1 having
only 0 in common with C2. Therefore, we conclude that
wS(V (r1, r2, . . . , r`−i+1)) ≥M`−i+1(C1, C2) and hence∑
r1∈C2
∑
r2∈C2
· · ·
∑
r`−i+1∈C2
wS(V (r1, r2, . . . , r`−i+1))
≥ q(`−i+1)k2M`−i+1(C1, C2)
= q(`−i+1)k2(n− ri + 1),
(20)
where the last equality follows from (9). Now notice that
wS(V (r1, r2, . . . ,r`−i+1))
=
n∑
m=1
dimπm(V (r1, r2, . . . , r`−i+1)),
which implies that∑
r1∈C2
∑
r2∈C2
· · ·
∑
r`−i+1∈C2
wS(V (r1, r2, . . . , r`−i+1)) =
∑
r1∈C2
∑
r2∈C2
· · ·
∑
r`−i+1∈C2
n∑
m=1
dimπm(V (r1, r2, . . . , r`−i+1)) =
n∑
m=1
∑
r1∈C2
∑
r2∈C2
· · ·
∑
r`−i+1∈C2
dimπm(V (r1, r2, . . . , r`−i+1)).
In each term the dimension can either be zero or one. It is
zero exactly when
πm(rk) = −πm(vk)
for all k = 1, 2, . . . , ` − i + 1. By the assumptions on vk,
we have that πm(rk) = −πm(vk) for at least qk2−1 of the
elements rk ∈ C2 for a specific m. Since this holds for all
k = 1, 2, . . . , `− i+ 1, we have that πm(rk) = −πm(vk), for
all k, at least q(`−i+1)(k2−1) times. Hence,
n∑
m=1
∑
r1∈C2
∑
r2∈C2
· · ·
∑
r`−i+1∈C2
dimπm(V (r1, r2, . . . , r`−i+1))
≤
n∑
m=1
q(`−i+1)k2 − q(`−i+1)(k2−1)
= nq(`−i+1)k2
(
1− q−(`−i+1)
)
Combining this inequality with (20) we obtain that
q(`−i+1)k2(n− ri + 1) ≤ nq(`−i+1)k2
(
1− q−(`−i+1)
)
⇔
ri ≥
n
q`−i+1
+ 1.
We first define the notion of shortening a secret sharing scheme
and prove some results on the shortened schemes parameters
before we prove the bounds on the threshold gap. Let C2 ⊆ C1
define a secret sharing scheme and let A ⊆ I∗. Now define
Ā = I∗\A. Then the shortened secret sharing scheme is given
by the code pair CA2 ( CA1 , where
CAi = πĀ(kerπA(Ci)).
Lemma 4.3: Let A ⊆ I∗ be a set of participants in
the secret sharing scheme defined by C2 ( C1 such that
Iq(S0,SA) = m. Denote by `A the dimension of LA, where
LA is a code such that CA1 = L
A ⊕CA2 . Additionally, denote
by tAi and r
A
i the partial privacy and reconstruction thresholds
of the shortened scheme CA2 ( CA1 , and let nA be the length
of the shortened codes. Then
nA = n− |A|,
`A = `−m
tAi ≥ ti+m − |A|,
rAi ≤ ri+m − |A|,
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `A}.
Proof: The result on nA follows from the definition of
πĀ. For `A we use Forney’s first duality lemma [14], stating
that for a code C,
dimC = dimπA(C) + dimC
A.
This leads to
`A = dimCA1 − dimCA2
= k1 − dimπA(C1)− k2 + dimπA(C2)
= `−m.
Now let B ⊆ Ā and notice, that knowing |B| shares in the
scheme CA2 ( CA1 corresponds to knowing |B∪A| = |B|+|A|
shares in the scheme C2 ( C1. However, for B = ∅, we
have Iq(S0,S∅) = 0 in the shortened scheme, while it gives
Iq(S0,SA) = m in the original scheme. So the information
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held by B in the shortened scheme equals Iq(S0,SA∪B)−m
in the original scheme.
If |B| + |A| ≤ ti+m, the participants will know at most
i + m − 1 q-bits in the scheme C2 ( C1. This corresponds
to knowing at most i− 1 q-bits in the shortened scheme, and
hence tAi ≥ ti+m − |A|, for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `A}.
Similarly for rAi , if |B|+ |A| ≥ ri+m, the participants in B
will know at least i q-bits in the shortened scheme, showing
that rAi ≤ ri+m − |A|.
We will use the notation ai and bi to describe the gaps between
ti and t, and r and r`−i+1, respectively. Therefore, denote by
ai = ti − t− i+ 1
bi = r − r`−i+1 − i+ 1.
(21)
Since t = t1, r = r`, we have that a1 = b1 = 0. Using that ti
and ri are strictly increasing with i we have that ai ≥ 0 and
bi ≥ 0.
Another way to interpret ai and bi is to consider the ti’s
and ri’s as a staircase. Two consecutive ti’s differ by at least
one unit. The values ai measure how different the sequence of
ti behaves from the case where all these steps t′i := ti − ti−1
are exactly 1 (this happens in the Blakley-Meadows’ scheme).
Indeed ai − ai−1 = ti − ti−1 − 1. So if all steps t′i are 1,
then all ai’s are 0, and in general ai =
∑i
j=2(t
′
i−1), the sum
of “all deviations from 1” up to step i. An analogous relation
holds with with ri and bi.
This also implies that ai and bi are non-decreasing with i,
which is useful in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4: Let C2 ( C1 define a secret sharing scheme.
Fix some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `} and let ai and bi be as in (21). If
ti ≥ i, then the threshold gap g satisfies
g ≥ n− t+ 1
q
+
q − 1
q
ai. (22)
If r`−i+1 ≤ n− i, then the threshold gap g satisfies
g ≥ r + 1
q
+
q − 1
q
bi. (23)
If both ti ≥ i and r`−i+1 ≤ n − i, then the threshold gap g
satisfies
g ≥ n+ 2
2q − 1
+
q − 1
2q − 1
(ai + bi).
Proof: Choose A such that |A| = t− 1 + ai. Hence, the
shortened scheme given by CA2 ( CA1 has parameters nA =
n − t + 1 − ai, rA ≤ r − t + 1 − ai, and tAi ≥ i by Lemma
4.3. By Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.3, the threshold gap now
satisfies
g = r − t ≥ rA + ai − 1
≥ n
A
q
+ ai
=
n− t+ 1− ai
q
+ ai
=
n− t+ 1
q
+
q − 1
q
ai.
By (9) and (10) one has that the dual scheme has thresholds
t⊥i = n−r`−i+1 and r⊥`−i+1 = n−ti. Therefore, the threshold
gap of the dual scheme is the same as for the original and ai
of the dual equals bi. We can use the bound in (22) on the
dual scheme if it holds that t⊥i ≥ i, but this is equivalent to
the assumption r`−i+1 ≤ n− i. Therefore, we obtain
g ≥ n− t
⊥ + 1
q
+
q − 1
q
bi =
r + 1
q
+
q − 1
q
bi.
The last bound is obtained by summing the bounds in (22)
and (23).
2g ≥ n− t+ 1 + r + 1
q
+
q − 1
q
(ai + bi)
=
n+ g + 2
q
+
q − 1
q
(ai + bi)⇔
g ≥ n+ 2
2q − 1
+
q − 1
2q − 1
(ai + bi).
The bounds in [7], stating that
g ≥ n− t+ 1
q
, g ≥ r + 1
q
, g ≥ BCCX(1)(n, q),
if t ≥ 1 and r ≤ n− 1, are a particular case of this theorem.
In the following example we will consider a scheme attain-
ing the bounds in Theorem 4.2. We will also note in which
cases, for this particular example, the bounds from Theorem
4.4 are sharp. Similar examples of codes attaining the bound
g ≥ n−t+1q can be found in [27].
Example 4.5: Let vT1 ,v
T
2 , . . . ,v
T
q` be all possible vectors in
F`q , and define the code C1 from the (` + 1) × q` generator
matrix
G =
[
v1 v2 · · · vq`
1 1 · · · 1
]
where C2 is generated by the last all-one row. Then clearly
Iq(S0, Sj) = 1 − 1 = 0 by (8) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, meaning
that t ≥ 1. In fact ti = i for all i in this example. This comes
from the fact that the canonical basis vectors and the all zero
vector lie in F`q . The set of participants corresponding to these
vectors is a set with cardinality `+1, which can reconstruct all
` q-bits. Therefore, t` ≤ `, and from this we conclude ti = i.
Hence, we will show that the bounds in Theorem 4.2 are sharp
for this secret sharing scheme, that is
ri =
n
q`−i+1
+ 1 =
q`
q`−i+1
+ 1 = qi−1 + 1.
We consider a set of participants A knowing i− 1 q-bits, and
derive that |A| ≤ qi−1, which means that qi−1 +1 participants
will know at least i q-bits, and hence ri ≤ qi−1+1. Combining
this with Theorem 4.2 yields ri = qi−1 + 1.
Thus, assume that A knows i − 1 q-bits and assume for
contradiction that |A| > qi−1. First notice that by (8), we
have
dimπA(C1) = i− 1 + dimπA(C2) = i
On the other hand, we can determine the dimension of πA(C1)
in another way by considering the generator matrix. Let A =
{j1, j2, . . . , jk}, where k > qi−1. Denote by
GA =
[
vj1 vj2 · · · vjk
1 1 · · · 1
]
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and
G′A =
[
vj1 vj2 · · · vjk
]
.
The rank of GA equals dimπA(C1). Clearly, rank(G′A) ≤
rank(GA), but since |A| > qi−1, we obtain rank(G′A) = i.
This means that we have i linearly independent columns, and
without loss of generality we denote these by vj1 ,vj2 , . . . ,vji .
Hence, all the columns in G′A must be of the form
a1vj1 + a2vj2 + · · ·+ aivji ,
for some ak ∈ Fq . However, since rank(G′A) = rank(GA)
one has that
∑i
k=1 ak = 1. Therefore, |A| ≤ qi−1, contradict-
ing the assumption on A.
From this we conclude that ri = qi−1 + 1, showing that the
bound in Theorem 4.2 is sharp for this example. The threshold
gap in this example can also be determined; g = r − t =
q`−1 +1−1 = q`−1. Now considering the bounds in Theorem
4.4 we show that some of these bounds are attained in this
case as well. Since ti = i, we have that ai = 0 for all i in
Theorem 4.4. Thus,
n− t+ 1
q
=
q` − 1 + 1
q
= q`−1 = g,
which shows that the inequality in (22) is sharp. We consider
the inequality in (23) as well, and since bi is non-decreasing
we determine b` in order to make the bound as good as
possible.
b` = r − r1 − `+ 1 = q`−1 + 1− 2− `+ 1 = q`−1 − `.
Hence, the bound states
g ≥ r + 1
q
+
q − 1
q
b` =
q`−1 + 2
q
+
q − 1
q
(
q`−1 − `
)
= q`−1 − `+ 2 + `
q
.
Note that there is no contradiction with g = q`−1, since the
bound does not hold for ` = 1 and q = 2. When ` = 1
we require, in order to use the bound, that r ≤ n − 1, but
n = 21 = 2 and r = 21−1 + 1 = 2 in this case.
For this bound to be sharp ` = 2+`q , which implies that
`(q − 1) = 2. Therefore, this bound is attained in the case
where ` = 2 and q = 2. The same would then hold for the
last bound in Theorem 4.4, since this bound is obtained by
summing the two previous bounds.
V. ASYMPTOTIC COMPARISONS
In this section we analyse the asymptotic behaviour of the
bounds presented in Theorem 3.2 when the number of players
n grows, and the size of the secret ` grows as a linear function
of n.
We assume the setting considered in [16]; let {Σj}∞j=1
denote an infinite family of Fq-linear secret sharing schemes
with increasing number of participants nj and where Σj has
secrets in F`jq , so that {`j}∞j=1 is a monotonely increasing
sequence such that
lim
j→∞
`j
nj
= L , for some L ∈ R with 0 < L < 1.
Figure 1. Illustration of Ω(3). The solid lines illustrate t(Σj)
nj
and r(Σj)
nj
,
both as a function of j, and the black vertical dashed line illustrates g(Σj)
nj
for a specific j.
To simplify, we assume that if we denote k1(j), k2(j) the
dimensions of the codes C1 and C2 in any nested code pair
representation of {Σj}, then k1(j)nj converges to some R1 ∈ R
and k2(j)nj converges to some R2 ∈ R. Clearly, L = R1 − R2
since `j = k1(j)− k2(j).
Denote the privacy threshold and reconstruction threshold
of Σj by t(Σj) and r(Σj) respectively. Furthermore, we define
Ω(1) = lim inf
j→∞
t(Σj)
nj
and Ω(2) = lim sup
j→∞
r(Σj)
nj
.
Additionally, we denote the threshold gap of Σj by g(Σj) and
define
Ω(3) = lim sup
j→∞
g(Σj)
nj
. (24)
Note that Ω(3) does not necessarily equal Ω(2)−Ω(1). Indeed,
in general we have
Ω(3) = lim sup
j→∞
(
r(Σj)
nj
− t(Σj)
nj
)
≤ lim sup
j→∞
r(Σj)
nj
− lim inf
j→∞
t(Σj)
nj
= Ω(2) − Ω(1).
(25)
but equality may not hold as the example illustrated in Figure
1 shows. The lower dashed line illustrates Ω(1) and the top
dashed line Ω(2). As we can see in the figure, the difference
between Ω(2) and Ω(1) is larger than the actual threshold gap,
which is the black vertical dashed line.
We now present the asymptotic version of the bound g ≥
BGr
(m)(n, q, `) together with bounds on Ω(1) and Ω(2).
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Theorem 5.1: Let {Σj} be a family of secret sharing
schemes over Fq as above. We have
Ω(1) ≤ q − 1
q
R2,
Ω(2) ≥ 1
q
+
q − 1
q
R1, (26)
Ω(3) ≥ 1
q
+
q − 1
q
L.
Proof: We have by Theorem 3.2 that the privacy threshold
satisfies
t(Σj)
nj
≤ q
mj+1 − qmj
qmj+1 − 1
(
k2(j)
nj
+
mj
nj
+
1
nj
)
− 1
nj
, (27)
the reconstruction threshold satisfies
r(Σj)
nj
≥ q
mj − 1
qmj+1 − 1
+
qmj+1 − qmj
qmj+1 − 1
(
k1(j)
nj
− mj
nj
− 1
nj
)
+
1
nj
,
(28)
and the threshold gap satisfies
g(Σj)
nj
≥ q
mj − 1
qmj+1 − 1
(
1 +
2
nj
)
+
qmj+1 − qmj
qmj+1 − 1
(
`j
nj
− 2mj
nj
)
.
(29)
where mj is any choice of m for Σj in Theorem 3.2,
i.e. mj ∈ {0, . . . , `j − 1}. In particular, we can choose
mj as a function of nj such that mj = o(nj) but still
limj→∞mj = ∞, for example mj = min{`j − 1, blog njc}
(where L > 0 implies that for large enough j, we simply have
mj = blog njc).
Letting j tend to infinity in (27), (28), and (29) with such
selection of mj , we obtain the results in (26).
It is not difficult to see that the bound
Ω(3) ≥ 1
q
+
q − 1
q
L
that we just derived is strictly tighter than the asymp-
totic versions of the bounds g ≥ `, BCCX(1)(n, q), and
BCCX(2)(n, q, `), which are respectively
Ω(3) ≥ L, Ω(3) ≥ 1
2q − 1
, Ω(3) ≥ 1
2q + 1
+
2q
2q + 1
L,
for any q and any 0 < L < 1. We show these four bounds on
Ω(3) in Figure 2 for the case q = 2.
In the rest of this section, we collect known results on upper
bounds for Ω(3), and compare them with the lower bounds we
have obtained.
We will consider algebraic geometric codes and random
codes. As far as the authors know, secret sharing schemes
from algebraic geometric codes yield the smallest values of
Ω(3) when the finite field Fq is sufficiently large, while random
codes give smaller Ω(3) for small q.
An algebraic geometric evaluation code is defined from
an algebraic function field F , a divisor G of F (which
determines a space of functions to be evaluated) and a set of
rational places in F (as evaluation points), the latter usually
represented by a divisor D. We remit the reader to [29]
Figure 2. Comparison of asymptotic bounds on the threshold gap for q = 2.
for details. Secret sharing schemes defined from algebraic
geometric codes where first considered in [8]. We here use the
construction from [10], defined by a nested code pair where
both codes are algebraic geometric codes defined using the
same function field F and the set of all rational places as
evaluation points, but different divisors G1, G2. Such secret
sharing schemes then satisfy t ≥ k2 − G and r ≤ k1 + G,
where G is the genus of the function field, and k1, k2 are as
always the dimensions of the two linear codes. Moreover, the
length of these codes (and hence the number of shares n) is
the number of rational places of the function field.
Consider now an optimal tower of function fields {Fj}∞j=1,
i.e. limj→∞
Nj
Gj = A(q) where Nj ,Gj are respectively the
number of rational places and genus in Fj and A(q) is the
so-called Ihara’s constant and Gj is the genus. Applying the
construction described above gives a family of secret sharing
schemes such that
Ω(1) ≥ R2 −
1
A(q)
,
Ω(2) ≤ R1 +
1
A(q)
,
see [16]. By (25) this implies
Ω(3) ≤ L+ 2
A(q)
. (30)
While Ihara’s constant A(q) has not been determined for
every q, we sum up some known facts next. First A(q) > 0
for all q, and in fact A(q) ≥ c log(q) for some constant c,
see for instance [24]. On the other hand, A(q) ≤ √q − 1,
see [30]. If q is a perfect square, it was shown in [18] that
A(q) =
√
q − 1. Furthermore, Garcia and Stichtenoth gave
a explicit construction [15] of an optimal tower of function
fields in this case.
Consequently, for small values of q, the bound in (30) is
trivial since A(q) ≤ 2. For large enough q, however, we have
A(q) > 2 (for example for q square with q ≥ 16).
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We observe the following, in relation with the lower bounds:
the difference between the upper bound (30) and the lower
bound from Theorem 5.1 is
2
A(q)
− 1
q
(1− L).
Note that the term 1q (1 − L) is precisely what the bound
in Theorem 5.1 has gained with respect to the lower bound
Ω(3) ≥ L. However this factor is overshadowed by the
considerably larger factor 2/A(q). It is an interesting open
question to bring these bounds together, by either proving
stronger lower bounds or improving the known constructions.
For small finite fields, the bounds in (30) are trivial and the
best upper bounds are achieved by inifinite families of secret
sharing schemes based on random codes. We follow the results
from [10]. The following result is a consequence of the fact
that random codes are on the Gilbert-Varshamov bound.
Proposition 5.2: Let C be a random variable with the
uniform distribution taking values in the set of all [n, k] linear
codes over Fq , and let 0 < d, d⊥ < (1− 1q )n be integers. For
a realization of C = C we then have
P (dmin(C) < d) ≤ qk+n(Hq(
d
n )−1)
P (dmin(C
⊥) < d⊥) ≤ qnHq( d
⊥
n )−k,
where Hq(x) = x logq(q−1)−x logq(x)−(1−x) logq(1−x)
is the q-ary entropy function.
The q-ary entropy function Hq is strictly increasing and
therefore injective in the interval [0, 1− 1q ] (we define Hq(0) =
0 as usual) and there its image is the interval [0, 1]. We can
therefore define the inverse H−1q : [0, 1] → [0, 1 − 1q ]. With
this definition in mind, we can choose dn = H
−1
q (1− kn − ε
′)
and d
⊥
n = H
−1
q (
k
n−ε
′) for some ε′ > 0 and both probabilities
above become lower than or equal to q−ε
′n.
A linear code C1 can be chosen uniformly at random from
all [n, k1] linear codes by rejection sampling of the elements
bi in its basis. The subcode C2 ( C1 generated by the last k2
basis elements is then also uniformly random among all [n, k2]
linear codes. Combining Proposition 5.2 and the comment
below with the inequalities in (11), we obtain
P
(
r
n
< 1−H−1q
(
1− k1
n
− ε′
)
+
1
n
)
≥ 1− q−ε
′n
P
(
t
n
> H−1q
(
k2
n
− ε′
)
− 1
n
)
≥ 1− q−ε
′n,
(31)
For any fixed ε′ > 0 the probabilities in (31) are larger than 0,
and hence by the probabilistic method we conclude that there
exists an infinite family of secret sharing schemes with
Ω(3) ≤ 1−H−1q (1−R1 − ε′)−H−1q (R2 − ε′) .
For a fixed L = R1−R2, the smallest value of the right-hand
side is attained by setting R1 close to 1 (and hence R2 close to
1−L) or, symmetrically, setting R2 close to 0 (and R1 = L).
In that case, the inequality becomes
Ω(3) ≤ 1−H−1q (1− L) + ε,
for any ε > 0.
Figure 3. Comparison of asymptotic lower and upper bounds (when R1 = 1)
on the threshold gap for q = 2.
In Figure 3, we compare this upper bound, in the case q = 2,
with our lower bound from equation (26).
At last, we make the following remark on the asymptotic
behaviors of the partial privacy and reconstruction thresholds,
which is one of the main focus in the work [16]. There the
authors define
Λ(1)(δ1) = sup
{
lim inf
j→∞
tm1(j)
nj
∣∣∣∣{m1(j)}∞j=1,
1 ≤ m1(j) ≤ `j , lim
j→∞
m1(j)
nj
= δ1L
}
,
Λ(2)(δ2) = inf
{
lim sup
j→∞
r`j−m2(j)+1
nj
∣∣∣∣{m2(j)}∞j=1,
1 ≤ m2(j) ≤ `j , lim
j→∞
m2(j)
nj
= δ2L
}
.
That is, asymptotically, no fraction less than Λ(1)(δ1) of the
participants holds more than a fraction of δ1 of the secret.
Similarly, Λ(2)(δ2) ensures that asymptotically a fraction of
Λ(2)(δ2) of the participants will be able to reconstruct a
fraction of 1− δ2 of the secret.
In [16] the gap between the limitations on Λ(1)(δ1) and
Λ(2)(δ2) and what is possible to achieve is almost closed. The
limitations considered there are derived from (12), i.e.,
Λ(1)(δ1) ≤ R2 + δ1L,
Λ(2)(δ2) ≥ R1 − δ2L.
(32)
We can obtain the same bounds from Theorem 3.2 by setting
m = 0. However, contrary to what happens in the proof of
Theorem 5.1, choosing m as a small fraction of ` will not
improve this bound in this case.
APPENDIX
LINEAR SECRET SHARING
Proposition A.1: A secret sharing scheme based on a nested
code pair C2 ⊆ C1 is a linear secret sharing scheme.
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Proof: Clearly, Si is a Fq-linear subspace. So we need to
show that S is uniformly distributed on some subspace V ⊆
S0 × S1 × · · · × Sn. Indeed, this is the case for
V = {(s, c) : s ∈ F`q, c ∈ (s1b1 + s2b2 + · · ·+ s`b`) + C2}.
First of all it is a subspace, so we show that S is uniformly
distributed on V .
P (S = (s, c1, c2, . . . , cn))
= P (SI∗ = (c1, c2, . . . , cn)|S0 = s)P (S0 = s)
=
1
qk2
1
q`
for S in V , showing that this construction resulting in a linear
secret sharing scheme.
Proposition A.2: All linear secret sharing schemes can be
represented by a nested code pair C2 ( C1.
Proof: Let a linear secret sharing scheme be given by S.
Let V be the subspace such that S is uniformly distributed on
V , and define
C2 = {c : (0, c) ∈ V where 0 ∈ S0, c ∈ S1 × S2 × · · · Sn}
C1 = {c : (s, c) ∈ V where s ∈ S0, c ∈ S1 × S2 × · · · Sn}
Clearly, C2 ⊆ C1 and both are linear subspaces and therefore
linear codes. Denote by k2 the dimension of C2 and k1 the
dimension of C1. Since both S and S0 are uniformly distri-
buted we also obtain that S|S0 = 0 is uniformly distributed
on C2 with probability function
pS(S|S0) =
pS(S)
pS0(S0)
=
1
qk1
1
q`
=
1
qk1−`
.
Hence, k2 = k1−`. Because all the shares uniquely determine
the secret in a secret sharing scheme, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between C1 and V , showing that for any
possible outcome of S there is a corresponding element in
C1. Therefore, we can represent the scheme using the nested
codes C2 ( C1.
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